Introduction
The relationship between the United States and the USSR began to change dramatically with the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to Premier. The leadership in the Soviet Union had been dominated by establishment elder leaders since the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev. Gorbachev began a vigorous program of perestroika ("restructuring") and glasnost ("being public") that brought sweeping reforms to the stagnant Soviet apparatus. In October of 1986 Gorbachev and Reagan meet in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss nuclear weapons. Both men detested their nuclear arsenals and each saw the value in a comprehensive negotiation over limiting their production and testing. President Reagan, in response to this nuclear threat, had begun to fund and develop a series of atmospheric defense missiles that could shoot down potential Soviet missiles en route for American targets. This program, entitled Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or more colloquially, "Star Wars"), was a major sticking point between Reagan and Gorbachev in agreeing to a resolution limiting nuclear weapons, In this meeting, President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev very nearly agreed a framework that would have eliminated all nuclear weaponry by the year 2000.
The relationship between the United States and the USSR began to change dramatically with the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to Premier. The leadership in the Soviet Union had been dominated by establishment elder leaders since the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev. Gorbachev began a vigorous program of perestroika ("restructuring") and glasnost ("being public") that brought sweeping reforms to the stagnant Soviet apparatus. In October of 1986 Gorbachev and Reagan meet in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss nuclear weapons. Both men detested their nuclear arsenals and each saw the value in a comprehensive negotiation over limiting their production and testing. President Reagan, in response to this nuclear threat, had begun to fund and develop a series of atmospheric defense missiles that could shoot down potential Soviet missiles en route for American targets. This program, entitled Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or more colloquially, "Star Wars"), was a major sticking point between Reagan and Gorbachev in agreeing to a resolution limiting nuclear weapons, In this meeting, President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev very nearly agreed a framework that would have eliminated all nuclear weaponry by the year 2000.
"...The President said that he thought the two sides were very close to an agreement.
Gorbachev noted that an addition should be made to the text which the Soviet side had just transmitted to the effect that during the next few years after the ten-year period the two sides should negotiate a mutually acceptable solution concerning their future course of action. The U.S. side feels that this should be SDI. The Soviet side might want something else. But the Soviet formula would permit finding a mutually acceptable solution for future activity after the ten-year period. Why would this not be satisfactory to the U.S.
The President replied that if both sides had completely eliminated nuclear weapons and there was no longer any threat, why would there be any concern if one side built a safeguard, a defensive system against non-existent weapons, in case there might be a need for it in the future? The President had a different picture – perhaps after the ten-year period the Soviet side would want to build new missiles, and would not want the U.S. to have defenses against them. But he preferred to see a different formula. Ten years from now he would be a very old man. He and Gorbachev would come to Iceland and each of them would bring the last nuclear missile from each country with them. Then they would give a tremendous party for the whole world.
Gorbachev interjected that he thought the two sides were close to reaching a common formula. He did not think the U.S. should suspect the Soviet Union of having evil designs. If it had such designs, it would not have gone so far in proposing reductions of strategic and medium-range missiles.
The President continued to describe his vision of their meeting in Iceland ten years from now. He would be very old by then and Gorbachev would not recognize him. The President would say, “Hello, Mikhail .” And Gorbachev would say, “ Ron , is it you?” And then they would destroy the last missiles.
Gorbachev replied that he did not know if we would live another ten years.
The President said he was counting on living that long....
The President said he had believed, and had said so in Geneva, that he and Gorbachev had the possibility of getting along as no two American and Soviet leaders ever had before. He had asked Gorbachev for a favor, which was important to him and to what he could do with Gorbachev in the future. Gorbachev had refused him that favor.
Gorbachev replied that if the President had come to him and said things are hard for American farmers, and asked him to buy some American grain, he would have understood. But what the President was asking him to agree to on behalf of the USSR was to allow the U.S. – at a time when they were proceeding to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons – to conduct full-scale research and development, including development of a space-based ABM system, which would permit the U.S. to destroy the Soviet Union's offensive nuclear potential. The President would not like it if Gorbachev had asked that of him. It would cause nervousness and suspicion. It was not an acceptable request. It could not be met. The President was not asking for a favor, but for giving up a point of principle....
The President said he was asking Gorbachev to change his mind as a favor to him, so that hopefully they could go on and bring peace to the world.
Gorbachev said he could not do it. If they could agree to ban research in space, he would sign in two minutes. They should add to the text “The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories,” as in the draft. The point was not one of words, but of principle...."
Gorbachev noted that an addition should be made to the text which the Soviet side had just transmitted to the effect that during the next few years after the ten-year period the two sides should negotiate a mutually acceptable solution concerning their future course of action. The U.S. side feels that this should be SDI. The Soviet side might want something else. But the Soviet formula would permit finding a mutually acceptable solution for future activity after the ten-year period. Why would this not be satisfactory to the U.S.
The President replied that if both sides had completely eliminated nuclear weapons and there was no longer any threat, why would there be any concern if one side built a safeguard, a defensive system against non-existent weapons, in case there might be a need for it in the future? The President had a different picture – perhaps after the ten-year period the Soviet side would want to build new missiles, and would not want the U.S. to have defenses against them. But he preferred to see a different formula. Ten years from now he would be a very old man. He and Gorbachev would come to Iceland and each of them would bring the last nuclear missile from each country with them. Then they would give a tremendous party for the whole world.
Gorbachev interjected that he thought the two sides were close to reaching a common formula. He did not think the U.S. should suspect the Soviet Union of having evil designs. If it had such designs, it would not have gone so far in proposing reductions of strategic and medium-range missiles.
The President continued to describe his vision of their meeting in Iceland ten years from now. He would be very old by then and Gorbachev would not recognize him. The President would say, “Hello, Mikhail .” And Gorbachev would say, “ Ron , is it you?” And then they would destroy the last missiles.
Gorbachev replied that he did not know if we would live another ten years.
The President said he was counting on living that long....
The President said he had believed, and had said so in Geneva, that he and Gorbachev had the possibility of getting along as no two American and Soviet leaders ever had before. He had asked Gorbachev for a favor, which was important to him and to what he could do with Gorbachev in the future. Gorbachev had refused him that favor.
Gorbachev replied that if the President had come to him and said things are hard for American farmers, and asked him to buy some American grain, he would have understood. But what the President was asking him to agree to on behalf of the USSR was to allow the U.S. – at a time when they were proceeding to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons – to conduct full-scale research and development, including development of a space-based ABM system, which would permit the U.S. to destroy the Soviet Union's offensive nuclear potential. The President would not like it if Gorbachev had asked that of him. It would cause nervousness and suspicion. It was not an acceptable request. It could not be met. The President was not asking for a favor, but for giving up a point of principle....
The President said he was asking Gorbachev to change his mind as a favor to him, so that hopefully they could go on and bring peace to the world.
Gorbachev said he could not do it. If they could agree to ban research in space, he would sign in two minutes. They should add to the text “The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories,” as in the draft. The point was not one of words, but of principle...."
Questions
- What concern did the Soviet Union have over the plan to phase out nuclear weapons within a ten year period?
- What reasoning did President Reagan offer for remaining steadfast in not removing the provision that made the Soviets nervous?
- How did Gorbachev refute President Reagan's rhetoric that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire?"
- What did President Reagan posit could happen ten years after this Reykjavik Summit if they came to an agreement?
- Towards the end of the excerpt Gorbachev "talks" to us the reader. Do you feel the way that Gorbachev predicted? Why or why not?
Reference Sources
Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds.America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit, 4th Session, October 12, 1986, Matlock MSS, Box 92140, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Calif.
Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds.America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit, 4th Session, October 12, 1986, Matlock MSS, Box 92140, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Calif.
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