Introduction
In the Summer of 1969, newly inaugurated President Nixon took a trip to tour American forces in the Pacific. Nixon saw the conflict in Vietnam as a potential stumbling block to approaching China and the Soviets with detente and so was looking for a way to bring the spiraling war to a responsible and strong conclusion. While on the island of Guam, President Nixon spoke informally of a new plan that would do just that, deescalate the war in Vietnam and begin to draw down American combat forces. Termed the "Nixon Doctrine," he planned to end the conflict by "Vietnamizing" it.
In the Summer of 1969, newly inaugurated President Nixon took a trip to tour American forces in the Pacific. Nixon saw the conflict in Vietnam as a potential stumbling block to approaching China and the Soviets with detente and so was looking for a way to bring the spiraling war to a responsible and strong conclusion. While on the island of Guam, President Nixon spoke informally of a new plan that would do just that, deescalate the war in Vietnam and begin to draw down American combat forces. Termed the "Nixon Doctrine," he planned to end the conflict by "Vietnamizing" it.
"...The United States is going to be facing, we hope before too long—no one can say how long, but before too long—a major decision: What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision, but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that decision is.
When I talked to Prime Minister [John Grey] Gorton [of Australia], for example, he indicated, in the conversations he had had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea—whether the United States would continue to play a significant role in Asia, … whether we would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.
This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking which will go into that decision is now. I think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitately to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long-range view which is essential for a policy that will be viable.…
As I see it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and as a result of the frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, "After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia," I am convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.
I think the way that we could become involved would be to attempt withdrawal, because, whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power....
So, what I am trying to suggest is this: As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role. It also poses, it seems to me, the greatest hope for progress in the world.…
We must recognize that there are two great, new factors which you will see, a very great growth of nationalism … national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.
The second factor is one that is going to, I believe, have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.
At this time, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have.
But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam...."
When I talked to Prime Minister [John Grey] Gorton [of Australia], for example, he indicated, in the conversations he had had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea—whether the United States would continue to play a significant role in Asia, … whether we would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.
This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking which will go into that decision is now. I think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitately to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long-range view which is essential for a policy that will be viable.…
As I see it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and as a result of the frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, "After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia," I am convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.
I think the way that we could become involved would be to attempt withdrawal, because, whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power....
So, what I am trying to suggest is this: As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role. It also poses, it seems to me, the greatest hope for progress in the world.…
We must recognize that there are two great, new factors which you will see, a very great growth of nationalism … national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.
The second factor is one that is going to, I believe, have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.
At this time, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have.
But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam...."
Questions
- What major question about vietnam was posed by President Nixon?
- What does President Nixon cite as evidence for our Vietnamese allies to question our commitments?
- What does President Nixon cite to explain the failures of United States foreign policy?
- How does President Nixon claim that the enemy uses our presence in Asia to win support?
- Identify and explain the new United States foreign policy plan in South East Asia: "Vietnamization."
Reference Sources
Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds.America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
Richard M. Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 544-56.
Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds.America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
Richard M. Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 544-56.
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