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October 1962 Advisory Meeting

4/14/2015

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Introduction
President Kennedy's foreign policy issues continued to worsen after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. As a result of this perceived aggression against Communist expansion, the Soviets constructed an eleven foot tall, cement wall encircling the isolated city of West Berlin. Not wanting to risk a renewed conflict in the heart of Europe, Kennedy remarked that "a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war." Tensions reached a boiling point when in the fall of 1962 American spy plans reported the discovery of Soviet nuclear weapons and missile silos on the island of Cuba, only ninety miles from Florida and well within range for a nuclear strike on all major U.S. cities. The text below is excerpted from a report presented to President Kennedy and his Executive Committee on October 25, 1962. This "Scenario for Airstrike against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba," weighs the pros and cons of a potential American strike to remove Soviet weapons and influence from the island of Cuba.

ADVANTAGES:
  1. Carries out PResident's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).
  2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of (Organization of American States] and majority of Security Council (United Nations].
  3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.
  4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.
  5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain for bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO, and elsewhere.
  6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and CUban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in the world.
  7. Removes military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.
  8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.



DISADVANTAGES:

  1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of a blockade.
  2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.
  3. Adverse effect on U.S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on Soviets in protection of our vital interests.
  4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.
  5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

Questions
  1. What is the most relevant and compelling reason given to President Kennedy to conduct an airstrike on Cuba?
  2. What is the most relevant and compelling reason given to President Kennedy not to conduct an airstrike on Cuba?
  3. What does it say about the beliefs of the president's advisors that there are more 'Advantages" than "Disadvantages?"
  4. What considerations does this list take into account with regards to a Soviet response?
  5. What considerations does this list take into account with regards to the United States's influence in the world?

Reference Sources
Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds.America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.

Report by advisory group led by Douglas Dillon, "Scenario for Airstrike against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba," Octtober 25, 1962 Digital National Security Archive, item number CC01334, Document Set: the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, ed. Laurence Chang (Alexandria, Va.: National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healey Inc., 1990).
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